Faith or Doctrine? Islam and Support for Political Violence in Pakistan

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Abstract

Discussions of how to deal with terrorism around the world have repeatedly touched on whether Islam contributes to a uniquely virulent strain of non-state violence targeted at civilians. These popular discussions almost always conceive of “Islam” in general terms, not clearly defining what is meant by Islamic religious faith. We address this debate by designing and conducting a large-scale public opinion survey in Pakistan. We measure multiple elements of religiosity, allowing us to separately consider the relationship of support for militancy with (1) personal piety, (2) support for political Islam, and (3) jihadism, which we define as a particular textual interpretation common to Islamist groups espousing violent political action. Further, we measure support for specific militant organizations using a novel form of an “endorsement experiment” to assess support for specific groups without asking respondents directly how they feel about them. We find that neither personal religious piety nor support for political Islam is correlated with support for militant organizations. However, Pakistanis who believe jihad is both an external militarized struggle and that it can be waged by individuals are more supportive of militant groups than those who believe it is an internal struggle for righteousness.

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Since the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, debates about the relationship between the Islamic faith and attitudes toward non-state political violence have been prominent in both public and scholarly discourse. Discussions of how to deal with terrorism in the United States, Israel, China, Western Europe, and South Asia have repeatedly touched on whether Islam contributes to a uniquely virulent strain of non-state violence targeted at civilians, with little agreement even among those from the same side of the political spectrum. Writing in the *Washington Post*, conservative commentator Charles Krauthammer (2006) asserted: “It is a simple and undeniable fact that the violent purveyors of monotheistic religion today are self-proclaimed warriors for Islam who shout ‘God is great’ as they slit the throats of infidels—such as those of the flight crews on Sept. 11, 2001—and are then celebrated as heroes and martyrs.” This view contrasts with explicit messages from other conservatives arguing against a link between Islam and violence. President George W. Bush, for example, said in 2002: “All Americans must recognize that the face of terror is not the true [face] of Islam. Islam is a faith that brings comfort to a billion people around the world. It’s a faith that has made brothers and sisters of every race. It’s a faith based upon love, not hate.”

These popular discussions almost always conceive of “Islam” in general terms, not clearly defining what they mean by Islamic religious faith. We address this debate by designing and conducting a large-scale (n=6,000) public opinion survey in Pakistan. Because our substantive focus is on what many argue is the most important country in the efforts to combat Islamist militancy, this study has obvious policy relevance. Studying Pakistani public opinion also provides unusually strong leverage on arguments about the links between religiosity and support for non-state violence more generally. The country has multiple active militant groups. Moreover, there is great variation in religious practice and ideology across Pakistan. There are serious cleavages across the main interpretative traditions within Islam (Barelvi, Shi’a, Deobandi, Ahl-e-Hadis, Jamaat-e-Islami, etc.), each of which forward their own definition of *sharia* (Ahmad and Reifeld 2004; Metcalf 2009;
Metcalf 2004; Marsden 2006; Rozehnal 2007). Additionally, there is disagreement among Pakistanis about how much Islam should form the legal framework of the state, including citizenship (Iqtidar 2011). Finally, given the state of Pakistan’s Islamist educational institutions, there is enormous variation in the quality of understanding about Islam across Pakistan irrespective of the particular tradition embraced (Nasr 2000).

Our survey design incorporated substantial advances in the conception and measurement of our key independent variable (Islamic religiosity) and the dependent variable (support for militancy). With respect to the independent variable, we measure multiple elements of religiosity, allowing us to separately consider the relationship of support for militancy with (1) personal piety, (2) support for political Islam, and (3) jihadism, which we define as a particular textual interpretation common to Islamist groups espousing violent political action. In doing so, we move beyond the simple question of “Does fundamentalist Islam produce terrorism?”, which is typical of many popular debates on the subject. Instead, we consider various aspects of Islamic religiosity. With respect to the dependent variable, we measure support for specific militant organizations using a novel form of an “endorsement experiment” to assess support for specific groups without asking respondents directly how they feel about them. Doing so is critical because attitudes toward these groups can be highly sensitive and asking about them directly can thus lead to biased responses and is even dangerous for survey teams in parts of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) provinces, both of which have ongoing insurgencies. Accordingly, even more than in other contexts respondents may offer what they believe to be the socially desirable response or simply not respond to certain questions.²

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¹ See Bullock, Imai, and Shapiro (2011) for a justification of this approach in an ideal point framework. See Blair, Imai, and Lyall (2011) for an application in Afghanistan.

² In WorldPublicOpinion.org polling in Pakistan, for example, item non-response on questions about al-Qa’ida ranged from 68% in February 2007, to 47% in September 2008, to 13% in May 2009. tanzeems endorsing polio vaccinations.
Using this approach we find that neither personal religious piety nor support for political Islam is correlated with support for militant organizations. A specific understanding of *jihad*, however, is related to support. Specifically, respondents who believe *jihad* is both an external militarized struggle and that it can be waged by individuals are 2.6 percentage points more supportive of militant groups than those who believe it is an internal struggle for righteousness. In absolute terms the effect is small but it represents more than one standard deviation in support for militant groups. Put differently, as Wiktorowicz (2005) and others have argued, it is the content of one’s religious beliefs that matters, not the practice of one’s beliefs.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 briefly reviews the literature on religion and support for political violence and derives three testable hypotheses. Section 2 describes our data. Section 3 describes the methods of analysis. In Sections 4 and 5 we present the results and discuss their implications.

**Background and Hypotheses**

In many ways the academic literature on links between Islam and support for political violence began with the “clash of civilizations” thesis (e.g. Huntington 1993, 1996; Lewis 1990) which argued that tensions between the Muslim world and the West were driven by an inherent conflict between Islam and Christianity. Following this idea, many public intellectuals argued that support for terrorism and violence against the West is rooted in Muslim religiosity or faith (see e.g. Laqueur 1999, Calvert 2002, Stern 2003, Mendelsohn 2005).³ Some public opinion research has identified patterns that are consistent with such an association. Pew surveys from 14 Muslim countries in 2002, for example, show that support for terrorism “to defend Islam from its enemies” is higher among those who believe that Islam is under threat and those who believe that Islam

³ For an excellent review of arguments about Islam and terrorism, see Jackson (2007).
should play more of a role in politics (Fair and Shepherd 2006; Bueno de Mesquita 2007). While religious devotion and prayer frequency are not associated with support for suicide attacks in a 2003-04 survey of Indonesian Muslims, Ginges et al. (2010) did find that among Palestinian Muslims in 1999 and 2006 and Israeli Jews in the West Bank and Gaza, attendance at religious services did predict support. These results suggest it may be important to differentiate between personal religious devotion (i.e. prayer, beliefs) as a driving force in support for violence and the “coalitional-commitment” effects that are a byproduct of religious involvement (i.e. attendance).

Direct evidence supporting a link between religiosity and support for militancy has been hard to find and there is substantial counter-evidence. The overwhelming majority of Muslims across countries oppose violence committed in the name of Islam (Esposito 2002) and it is not obvious that orthodoxy among Muslims leads to intolerance or fanaticism. Clingingsmith, Khwaja and Kremer (2009) exploit the fact that Pakistani pilgrims have to enter a lottery to make the Hajj to show that trends towards Islamic orthodoxy and feelings of Muslim unity following the pilgrimage (relative to otherwise identical individuals who did not make the Hajj) were accompanied by greater feelings of peace and tolerance towards non-Muslims. Similarly, Fair, Ramsay and Kull (2008) analyze a September 2007 survey in Pakistan to show that support for giving sharia law a greater role in governance was not associated with support for extreme religious conservatism. Drawing on interviews of recruits in the militant British Islamist group al-Muhajiroun, Wiktorowicz (2005) concluded that those who were more religious were actually less supportive of al-Muhajiroun’s message. Ultimately, the evidence on links between personal piety and support for militant groups is ambiguous. We therefore state the most prominent side in the public side of the debate as a testable alternative hypothesis:

**H1:** Personal piety is positively related to support for Islamist militant organizations.
A second potential link between Islam and support for militancy may arise from sympathy with political positions sold as being Islamic, what we refer to as support for political Islam. Indeed, public opinion data from Egypt, Kuwait, Palestine, Jordan, and Lebanon similarly show that while Muslims’ personal piety, (i.e. prayer frequency) had no correlation with attitudes toward conflict with Israel, “ politicized Islam” was negatively associated with peaceful attitudes (Tessler and Nachtwey 1998). Specific political grievances are one of the few reliable predictors of support for militant actions. Chiozza (2009) finds that among Muslims in Jordan and Lebanon, the strongest predictor of support for suicide bombings against American forces in Iraq was disaffection towards the American people, and that religiosity was associated with support for attacks only when accompanied by fear for one’s Muslim identity. Research on Palestinian public opinion towards Israel has repeatedly found no link between support for political Islam and militancy towards Israel, finding instead that perceiving a threat from Israel is strongly associated with support for violence (Tessler 2003; Tessler 2004; Shikaki 2006). National surveys in Algeria and Jordan from 2002 also showed that higher levels of religious involvement did not make individuals more likely to approve of terrorist acts against the U.S., while attitudes towards their government and U.S. foreign policy did (Tessler and Robbins 2007). The evidence is not unambiguous. Furia and Lucas (2008) use data from the 2002 Arab Values Survey conducted in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and the UAE to show that Arab Muslims with higher levels of “Islamic consciousness” were no more hostile to Western countries than others. However, in Pakistan many avowedly Islamist parties in Pakistan take positions that are explicitly tolerant of some forms of political violence, leading to our second testable hypothesis.

4 Kalenthaler et. al. (2010) find similarly that in Pakistan those who were more tolerant of the imposition of extreme Islamist views in 2007 and 2009, what was then called “Talibanization,” were more likely to believe that attacks on civilians could be justified.
H2: Support for Islamist politics and/or the goals of Islamist parties is positively related to support for Islamist militant organizations.

An alternative approach to thinking about links between religion and support for militant groups would suggest that when religion speaks to a particular issue, what respondents believe it says about that issue will be influential. In our case, the key issue is what Pakistanis believe Islam says about the use of violence by non-state organizations, or their conception of jihad. Although jihad in the Western World is often associated with vigilante behavior among radical adherents of Islam (e.g. suicide bombings by individuals), there is no convergence of such beliefs in Pakistan based on formal religious texts or the religious scholars who explicate these texts. Very few Pakistanis can read the Quran and the Sunnah (accounts of the sayings and actions of the Prophet Mohammad, also called the Hadith) and fewer yet are familiar with Islamic juridical rulings on jihad. For the vast majority of Pakistanis what they believe about jihad is determined by what they are told by preachers (a.k.a. maulvis, ulema, mullahs). In recent decades the quality of Islamic education among these religious preachers has declined and what these preachers say on key issues like jihad is understood by scholars to be more about their political agendas than about retaining fidelity to their relevant school of jurisprudence (Nasr 2000).

Given this state of affairs, there is considerable heterogeneity in how Pakistanis understand the concept of jihad. Two areas of interpretative disputes are critically relevant for claims made by militant groups to justify their actions and arguments. The first is over whether this jihad is a largely

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5 In Sunni Islam there are four classical interpretative schools of jurisprudence (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’I and Hanbali) and three major schools in Shi’a Islam (Jafari, Ismaeli, Zaidiyya), all of which are named after the classical jurists who founded them. These schools may share many rulings, yet they differ with respect to the various hadiths that they accept as authentic. Each of the schools understand key issues such as jihad and blasphemy as well as personal law and other aspects of daily life in important yet subtly different ways. The dominant school in Pakistan is Hanafi among Sunnis and Jafari and Ismaeli among Shias (Esposito 1980).
internal struggle for righteousness or an external militarized struggle to defend Muslims. The second is over who has the authority to use military force in the name of jihad: the government or non-state actors (Rahman 2009). Violent political organizations clearly view jihad as an external struggle and as extra-state actors do not believe that only the government should undertake it. Hence, we formulate our third hypothesis:

**H3:** *Those who believe jihad involves militarized struggle and can be conducted by non-state actors will be more supportive of militant groups.*

**Data and Measures**

Our survey was designed to achieve three goals. First, we sought to measure attitudes towards specific militant organizations in a way that minimized item non-response on these sensitive questions that had plagued previous surveys in Pakistan. We met this objective by using the “endorsement experiment” described below to measure support for four specific groups. Second, we wanted to measure a range of dimensions of religiosity in order to better understand how religious beliefs might impact support for violent political organizations. Finally, we wanted to survey a representative sample of the Pakistani population, including rural and urban areas in each of Pakistan’s four main provinces. This simply required a very large sample and having interviewers go to remote areas of the country.

**Survey Design and Implementation**

Working with our Pakistani partners, Socio-Economic Development Consultants (SEDCO),

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6 For a more extensive discussion of jihad and the textual debates from different schools of jurisprudence and key proponents of particular views, see Wordsmiths Compilation (2001).

7 Surveys in Pakistan which ask directly about affect towards militant groups obtain don’t know/no opinion rates in the range of 40% (Terror Free Tomorrow 2008; Pew 2009). Surveys which indirectly measure affect by asking whether groups “operating in Pakistan are a problem” (IRI 2009) or pose “a threat to the vital interests of Pakistan” (WPO 2009) still obtain item non-response rates as high as 31 percent.
we used the Pakistan Federal Bureau of Statistics sample frame to draw a stratified random sample of 6,000 adult Pakistani men and women from the four main provinces of the country: Punjab, Sindh, KPK, and Balochistan. Respondents were selected randomly within 500 primary sampling units (PSU), 332 in rural areas and 168 in urban ones (following the rural/urban breakdown in the Pakistan census). We substantially oversampled in the smaller provinces (Balochistan and KPK) to ensure we could generate valid estimates in these sparsely populated provinces. We calculated post-stratification survey weights based on population figures from the 1998 census, the most recent one available. Following procedures outlined by Lee and Forthofer (2006), all analyses reported below were weighted and clustered to account for design effects.

The face-to-face questionnaire was fielded by six mixed-gender teams between April 21, 2009 and May 25, 2009. The AAPOR RR1 response rate was 71.8 percent, which is comparable to the extremely high response rates achieved by high-quality academic studies such as the General Social Survey. Full question wordings are provided in Appendix A. All variables described below were coded to lie between 0 and 1, so that we can easily interpret a regression coefficient as representing a β% change in the dependent variable associated with moving from the lowest possible value to the highest possible value of the independent variable. We pre-tested the questionnaire to residents of Islamabad, Peshawar, and Rawalpindi between March 20 and 26, 2009, to assess the functioning of the items and experiments. Several design decisions came about as a result of what we learned during pretesting. Descriptive statistics of the sample are presented in Table 1.

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

Measuring the Dependent Variable: Support for Violent Political Organizations

Asking respondents directly whether they support militant organizations has numerous
problems in places suffering from political violence. First, and perhaps most importantly, it can be unsafe for enumerators and respondents to discuss such issues. SEDCO personnel themselves raised numerous concerns with directly asking about support for militancy. Second, item non-response rates to such sensitive questions are often quite high given that respondents can fear that providing the “wrong” answer will threaten their own and their family’s safety. We therefore use an endorsement experiment to measure support for specific Islamist militant organizations.\(^9\)

The experiment involves assessing support for various real policies, which are relatively well known but about which Pakistanis do not have strong feelings (as we learned during pretesting) and works as follows:

- Respondents are randomly assigned to treatment or control groups (one-half of the sample is assigned to each group).
- Respondents in the control group were asked their level of support for four policies, measured on a five-point scale and recoded to lie between 0 and 1 for the analysis.
- Respondents in the treatment group are asked identical questions but then are told that one of four groups mentioned in section 1 supports the policy. Which group is associated with each of the policies is randomized within the treatment group.
- The difference in means between treatment and control groups provides a measure of affect towards the groups, since the only difference between the treatment and control conditions is the group endorsement.

Figure 1 provides a sample question, showing the treatment and control questions, and illustrates the randomization procedure in visual form. As shown in Table 1, randomization checks indicate balance between treatment and control groups.

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\(^9\) This approach builds on the technique introduced in Lupia and McCubbins (1998).
The advantage of this approach is that the militant organization is not the primary object of evaluation; the policy is. We expected respondents to be more willing to share their opinions on uncontroversial policies rather than controversial groups and, judging by our non-response rates, and they were. Our survey posed a number of less-sensitive direct questions (i.e., without an endorsement experiment) about militant groups (i.e., those that did not measure direct support) such as “What is the effect group X’s actions on their cause?” Non-response on these items ranged from 22% for al-Qa’ida to 6% for the Kashmir Tanzeem. Item non-response on the endorsement experiment questions, by contrast, ranged from a high of 7.6% for al-Qa’ida endorsing Frontier Crimes Regulation reform to a meager 0.6% for the sectarian tanzeems endorsing polio vaccinations. While this approach is not perfect, the low item non-response rate in our survey provides *prima facie* evidence that it also reduced respondents’ concerns about reporting sensitive information.¹⁰

We used this method to measure support for four groups—the Kashmiri tanzeems, the Afghan Taliban, al-Qa’ida, and the sectarian tanzeems—which required asking about four policy issues: polio vaccinations, reforming the frontier crimes regulation (the legal code governing the FATA), redefining the Durand line (the border separating Pakistan from Afghanistan), and requiring madrassas to teach math and science.¹¹ By randomizing which group is associated with which policy

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¹⁰ Compared to other surveys, the contrast between direct questions and this approach is even starker. The PIPA 2007 survey of urban Pakistanis, for example, had a DK/NR rate of around 20 percent on most of the questions but for questions about the activities of Pakistan-based militant groups, the DK/NR rate was sometimes in excess of 50 percent. When PIPA asked different samples of Pakistanis “How do you feel about al Qaeda?” in 2007, 2008 and 2009, DK/NR rates were 68 percent, 47 percent and 13 percent, respectively. When Pakistanis were asked who perpetrated the 9/11 attacks, DK/NR rates were 63 percent and 72 percent in 2007 and 2008, respectively (Fair et al. 2008). The Pew Global Attitudes Survey encountered similar problems when they asked (predominantly urban) Pakistanis whether they have “a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion” of al Qa’ida. In 2008 and 2009, the DK/NR rates were 41 percent and 30 percent, respectively. When the same question was posed about the Taliban in 2008 and 2009, the DK/NR rates were 40 percent and 20 percent, respectively (Pew 2009).

¹¹ We did not employ this method to assess support for the Pakistani Taliban. Within our budget for the survey we could only interview 6,000 respondents (twice as large as any other extent survey of Pakistani public opinion). This meant we could only study four groups (i.e., divide the sample into four cells) while getting reasonable precision at the provincial level. Given this constraint, we omitted an endorsement
among the treatment group, we control for order effects and randomize the pairing of issue with
group. We then average across groups to generate a measure of support for militancy that is (a)
based on support for specific organizations and (b) unlikely to be biased by the details of any
specific policy.

For an endorsement experiment of this type to work the policies need to have two
characteristics. First, they need to be ones about which respondents do not have overly strong
prior opinions so that a group’s endorsement might affect their evaluation of the policy. This
procedure would not work in the U.S., for example, if one asked about banning abortion, for which
prior attitudes are strong. Second, the policies have to be at least somewhat familiar to respondents
since the group endorsement has to be meaningful. In the U.S., for example, one could not ask
about an obscure mining regulation since respondents may not provide meaningful responses and
endorsements may have limited impacts. While the policies we studied may seem high valence to
professional students of politics, they do not appear to be so for most Pakistanis. During pre-testing,
we found that most respondents knew about all four issues but did not have strong opinions on
them. Our enumerators likewise felt these issues would be ones respondents would know something
about but at the same time not have extremely rigid positions, a telling fact since our enumerators
were all professionals averaging 4.6 years of experience.

To construct our dependent variable of support for militancy, we measure the average
support reported by the respondents for the four policies on a five-point scale. Recall that one of the
four militant groups was randomly assigned to be associated with each policy in the treatment group.
Below, we leverage random assignment into treatment (endorsement) and control to measure
differential support for militancy—as proxied by support for the policies. The main dependent
variable therefore was a twenty-point scale, recoded to lie between 0 (no support for all four policies) to 1 (a great deal of support for all four policies). In the control group, the policy scale had a mean value of .79 (s.d. = .15).

**Measuring the Independent Variable: Religiosity and Views of Jihad**

We employ a range of questions to study the relationships between various aspects of religious belief and support for militancy.

**Personal Piety**

To test H1, we measured personal piety in two ways. First, we asked respondents: “Do you attend *dars-e-quran*?” *Dars-e-quran*, has roughly the same meaning as “bible study” in the U.S. and carries similar valence about individuals’ personal religiosity. For respondents who said “yes,” we also asked: “How many times do you go to *dars-e-quran* per week on average?” We divide respondents into three groups: (1) those who attend *dars-e-quran* daily (19.9% of respondents); (2) those who attend less than daily (37.2%); and (3) those who do not attend at all (43.0%).

Second, we asked respondents: “If a child in your house were to study *bafz-e-Quran* or *nazira* [i.e., form of religious education], what kind of madrassa or school would you like them to attend?” with a list of interpretive traditions. There are four major interpretive schools of Sunni Islam in Pakistan—Jamaat-e-Islami, Ahl-e-hadith, Deobandi, Barlevi—each of which espouses somewhat different views on both the interpretation of various religious texts and on a range of issues of religious practice. We divide respondents into two groups: (1) those who identify a specific school for their child’s notional education (34.4%); and (2) those who report *ahle-e-sunnat* as the sect (65.6%), which indicates only a generic preference for Sunni Islam.\(^{13}\) The analogy in the U.S. context would be to consider people who can identify a specific branch of Christianity for their child's

\(^{13}\) The small number of shi’ite respondents was excluded.
education (e.g. “Greek Orthodox” or “Seventh Day Adventist”) as being more pious than those who simple indicate “Christian.”

Islamic Politics

Support for violent politics is often thought to relate to support for Islamist political parties in part because individual members of key Islamist parties in Pakistan do vocally support jihad (see inter alia International Crisis Group 2003, 2004; Ali 2010). Analysts assume therefore that a vote for such Islamist parties should be tantamount to supporting the party’s jihadist politics. To assess such assumptions and test H2, we measure three variables to capture whether respondents are generally supportive of the policy positions of Islamists in Pakistan.

First, we asked respondents “Which political party best represents your views/you like the most?” and identified respondents who chose an explicitly Islamist or right-of-center party.14 In Pakistan, there are several explicitly Islamist religious parties such as Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), various factions of the Jamiat Ulema-Islam (JUI), and a coalition of several religious parties known as the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA). These parties are often called “ulema parties,” because their leaders and candidates are purportedly Islamic scholars or alims (pl. ulema). Additionally, there are several so-called mainstream parties that adopt policies that are sympathetic or even consonant with those of the ulema parties. However, their leadership tends to consist of lay persons. Parties that fall into this “right of center” category include the various factions of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) as well as the newly ascendant Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). While there is no genuinely secular party in Pakistan any more, there are a number of groups which can be classified as “left of center.” In general these parties offer a more progressive social agenda and prefer greater distance

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14 We coded the following as right-of-center parties: Pakistan Muslim League (PML-Q), Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz (PML-N), Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Fazlur Rehman) (JUI-F). Only 162 respondents cited Islamist parties (MMA and JUI-F) as their preferred party. We could not precisely estimate the treatment effect among this small subgroup, necessitating the pooling of all right-of-center parties.
between the “mosque and the state.” Parties which are often considered “left of center” are the ethno-nationalist parties in Sindh, Balochistan, and KPK (e.g. Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM), factions of the Awami National Party (ANP), and the Balochistan National Party (BNP)). In many cases, these ethno-nationalist parties are deeply antagonistic to the ulema parties (Baxter et al. 2002; Cohen 2004; Fair et al. 2010). 53.4% of respondents expressed a preference for a right-of-center party.

Second, we asked respondents how much they supported the imposition of *sharia* law, which refers broadly to laws based in Islam: “Seeing the current situation in Pakistan, do you think that Shari’a should play a much larger role in Pakistan law (35.7%), a somewhat larger role (31.8%), about the same role (22.9%), a somewhat smaller role (7.7%), or a much smaller role (2.0%)?”

Because Pakistanis dispute the exact content of such laws (based on varying interpretations of injunctions in foundational Islamic texts), we measured the extent to which respondents agreed with Islamist arguments. Specifically, Islamist parties in Pakistan and elsewhere often argue that the implementation of *sharia* law would involve using physical punishments for crimes such as theft and adultery. We asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed that sharia government meant: “A government that uses physical punishments (stoning, cutting off of hands, whipping) to make sure people obey the law.” 55.5% of respondents agreed that sharia law implied these physical punishments. Taken together, these three questions provide a range of ways of capturing sympathy with Islamist political positions.

*Conceptions of Jihad*

Finally, we tested H3 by eliciting respondents’ views about *jihad*. *Jihad* is commonly interpreted in the West to mean the use of violence in the name of Islam. In Islamic countries, its content is much more nuanced and complex. We asked two questions to cast light on the diversity of Pakistanis’ opinion on jihad.
First, we asked respondents which of the following statements reflected their view of *jihad*:

“*Jihad* is solely a personal struggle for righteousness,” “*Jihad* is both a personal struggle for righteousness and protecting the Muslim Ummah through war,” or whether “*Jihad* is solely protecting the Muslim Ummah through war.”

Respondents who provided one of the last two response options were asked: “Some people say only a Muslim state/government can use military force to protect a Muslim country or Ummah in the name of *jihad*. Others say individuals and non-state organizations can use military force in the name of *jihad*. What do you think?” and were provided three options: “Only states/governments should use military force in the name of *jihad*;” “Both states/governments and individuals should use military force in the name of *jihad*;” “Only individuals should use military force in the name of *jihad*.” These two questions assess where Pakistanis lie on two major dimensions of disagreement about *jihad* in Pakistani discourse.

Respondents were classified into three categories: (1) those who answered “*Jihad* is solely a personal struggle for righteousness” in response to the first question (31.0% of respondents); (2) those who answered “Only states/governments should use military force in the name of *jihad*” in response to the second question” (i.e., those who believe that *jihad* is an external, state-level struggle) (30.4%); and (3) all others respondents, or those who answered either “Both states/governments and individuals should use military force in the name of *jihad*” or “Only individuals should use military force in the name of *jihad*” in response to the third question (i.e., those who believe that *jihad* is an external, non-state struggle) (38.6%). In the regression analyses, the first group (respondents who conceive of *jihad* as a personal struggle for righteousness) will be the baseline category.

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15 These questions are being refined in ongoing research, but as is they represent an improvement over previous surveys of Pakistan and other Arab countries that asked about support for *jihad* without discerning what respondents understand *jihad* to be.
Methods of Analysis

Our measure of support for the militant organization is the treatment effect of the endorsement, or the difference in policy support between the control group and the treatment group. Recall that respondents in the control group reported their support level for all four policies without any endorsements. Respondents in the treatment group also reported their support for the four policies, but each policy was endorsed by one of the four militant organizations. The assignment of group to policy was randomized within the treatment group, so we can construct a dependent variable measuring support for militancy by averaging the respondent reports across the four policies. We then leverage random assignment into treatment (endorsement) and control to measure differential support for militancy—as proxied by support for the policies.

To assess the effect of our religion measures on support for the militant groups, we estimate the following equation via ordinary least squares (OLS):

\[ P_i = \beta T_i + \eta R_i + \gamma T_i R_i + \lambda x_i + \alpha_p + \epsilon_i \]  \hspace{1cm} (1)

where \( P_i \) represents the overall policy support, \( T_i \) is a dummy variable indicating that respondent \( i \) is in the treatment condition, \( R_i \) represents a religiosity measure, \( x_i \) is a vector of demographic controls, \( \alpha_p \) are region fixed effects, and \( \epsilon_i \) is stochastic error. The parameter of interest is \( \gamma \), which represents how the treatment effects vary by different values of the religiosity measures. This is a difference-in-difference (DID) estimate. In other words, we are comparing the differences in policy support between the treatment and control groups for two subgroups—those scoring “high” on a religiosity measure and those scoring “low” on that measure. We add additional terms to equation (1)—for example, interaction terms between the treatment dummy and the demographic variables \( (T_i x_i) \)—to assess the robustness of significant findings.

Some policies will exhibit greater treatment effects than others because prior attitudes are less well-formed. We use the variance of the responses in the control group to proxy looseness of
pre-treatment attitudes and weight each policy response by this variance. Hence, we place greater weight on policies where we expect there to be a greater likelihood that attitudes will be shifted in response to the endorsements.\textsuperscript{16}

**Results**

**Tests of H1 (Personal Piety)**

Religious Attendance. Compared to respondents who never attended *dars e koran*, those who attended irregularly and daily were both no more likely to exhibit higher treatment effects in the endorsement experiment. In other words, religious attendance manifests no relationship with support for militant political organizations. As shown in column (1), the interaction terms representing the DID estimates were both statistically insignificant and substantively small.

Commitment to a Sect. Similarly, respondents who were committed to raising their children in a specific sect of Sunni Islam (an indicator of religious knowledge and devotion) were not more likely to support the militant groups than those who did not specify a particular sect. In fact, the interaction term between group cue and sect identification was significant and negative (see column 2), suggesting that religious devotees exhibited 2.4 percentage points lower support for the groups.

One possible reason why this sign is negative is that identification with a particular Sunni sect over the more general category Ahl-e-Sunnat suggests an individual has gone through a process of religious differentiation. Answering Ahl-e-Sunnat is somewhat akin to a person answering “Christian” when queried about their religious identification in contrast to someone else who answers “Missionary Baptist”, “Church of the Four Square”, or “Coptic Christian.” That process of

\textsuperscript{16} The results are substantively similar without this weighting and so we report weighted results throughout as we believe they more accurately capture the impact of cues on attitudes. The weight vector $\mathbf{w}$ for the four policies (vaccination plan, FCR reforms, Durand line, curriculum reform) was: (.983, 1.15, 1.28, 1.18), meaning that the weight for the control group was the average of these four individual weights (1.15). The post-stratification weight was multiplied by $\mathbf{w}$ to produce the overall sampling weight.
differentiation typically involves being proselytized and becoming actively involved in religious practices. Both should, on average, lead to greater personal knowledge about Islam and a concomitant ability to resist arguments that Islamist militants’ use of violence is an appropriate defense of Muslims. Our results thus echo Wiktorowicz (2005) who found that British Muslims who were more knowledgeable about Islam were more resistant to the calls of the extremist group Al Muhajiroun than “deracinated” British Muslims because the former could argue more effectively with al Muhajiroun activists and recruiters. Those with little or no understanding of the faith they nominally professed were, in contrast, unable to identify, much less argue against, the specious claims advanced by the organization.

**Tests of H2 (Political Islam)**

*Support for Right-of-Center Political Parties.* Supporters of center-right parties were no more supportive of the militant groups than those who supported avowedly secular parties (see column 3 of Table 2). Of course, this null result may reflect our inability to distinguish supporters of positions espoused by both these parties and Islamists from those who like the parties for other reasons. It is, however, inconsistent with an expectation that those on the right side of Pakistani politics are more tolerant of militant groups.

*Views of Sharia Law.* Muslims vary considerably in their views of what sharia law entails for Islamic practice. As mentioned above, the most common conception of sharia by Westerners—corporal and physical punishment—is actually not universally accepted by Muslims in Pakistan. Nonetheless, even adherents of this more extreme form of sharia law are no more likely to support political violence than those who do not believe that sharia requires physical punishment (see column 4 of Table 3). Further, regardless of their interpretation of sharia, respondents who thought

---

17 At the time our survey was fielded PML-N and PML-Q positions aligned with Islamist positions mainly on peace negotiations with Pakistani Taliban, on implementing Sharia in Swat, and on supporting the Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan among other foreign and domestic policies issues.
that sharia should play a greater role in Pakistani law were no more likely to support militant groups than respondents who wanted a stricter separation of church and state (see column 5). Therefore, it does not appear that Islamism—or the belief that Islam should play a greater role in Pakistani government—is related to support for militancy.

**H3 (Conceptions of Jihad)**

Even though most of our measures of religious practice and devotion are unrelated to support for militancy, one religiosity variable emerges as a strong predictor: how the respondent interprets *jihad*. As mentioned above, although jihad is commonly interpreted by Americans to be associated with violence in the name of Islam, this is not the universally accepted view across the Muslim world. Respondents who view *jihad* as an internal religious struggle (or as an external but state-level struggle) are significantly less likely to support militant groups than those who view it as a violent, extrastate struggle. As shown in the shaded cell of column 1 in Table 3, violent jihadists exhibit 2.3 percentage points greater support than those who do not associate jihad with militarism (∧ = .03). In addition to being statistically significant, this estimate is substantially important as well. The 2.3 percentage point change represents almost two standard deviations of conditional mean level of support for the policy in the control group (i.e. the constant term in these regressions) and is almost twice the impact of the group endorsement among those who believe *jihad* is strictly an internal struggle. Further, respondents who believe that *jihad* is an external, extra-state struggle exhibit 1.9 percentage points greater support for the militant groups than respondents who believe that *jihad* is an external but state-level struggle (see the difference between the two interaction terms in Table 3). A Wald test confirms that this difference is statistically significant (∧ = .08).

We estimated several versions of this specification to demonstrate the robustness of this result. As shown in Table 3, we estimate successively more saturated versions of the regression model. In column (2), we estimate a model including a host of demographic controls. Column (3)
listwise deletes respondents who did not answer the income question. In column (4), we also include interaction terms between the group cue and the demographic controls. Finally, in column (5), we include all the religiosity measures mentioned above and their associated interactions terms with the treatment dummy. The coefficient estimate on the interaction term between the group cue and a violent conception of jihad is highly stable across all four specifications, ranging between .023 and .027. In all five specifications, the coefficient achieves statistical significance at the 95% level. Moreover, for none of the other four religion variables is the interaction term positive and significant in specification (5). Finally, the difference between those who believe that jihad implies non-state action versus those who believe it allows only state action ranges between 1.4-1.9 percentage points across specifications and is statistically significant in all models except equation (4), where it approaches significance ($p = .13$).

Conclusion

Links between Islam and political violence have been a prominent feature of academic and policy debates about how to deal with problems of terrorism and of political violence and instability in the Arab World and South Asia. In order to bring empirical evidence to those discussions, we designed and fielded a large-scale ($n=6,000$) public opinion survey in Pakistan which measured support for specific militant organizations and several distinct aspects of religiosity. Strikingly, the only measure of religiosity in our survey that is consistently and positively correlated with support for militant organizations is a specific vision of religious doctrine. Those who believe that jihad is a militarized struggle that can be conducted by individuals are fully 2.3%-2.7% more supportive of policies endorsed by militant groups than individuals who believe jihad is an internal struggle for righteousness. While the effect may seem small, it is between one and two times the standard deviation in support for policies in the control group. Further, those who
interpret *jihad* as meaning external, extra-state action were significantly more supportive than those who interpret *jihad* as an external, state-level action.

Our findings have at least two important practical implications. First, efforts to deal with the potential for violence in Islamist political movements should focus on the content of religious doctrine. In this sense, nascent programs in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Saudi Arabia that seek to enlist religious scholars in deconstructing and delegitimizing the theological justifications for violent politics should be welcomed and supported. Second, the prospect of Islamist parties coming to power in the wake of the Arab Spring should not necessarily be viewed with alarm. It is only when the theological tradition embraced by party leaders legitimizes the use of non-state violence for political ends that policy makers in other countries should be concerned.

From an empirical perspective, we have contributed to a debate about the relationship between Islam and violence that is often tall on rhetoric but short on evidence. In measuring the dependent variable, we introduce a novel approach as applied to the study of Islamic militancy designed to reduce non-response and deal with the sensitive nature of the subject. In conceptualizing the independent variable of religiosity, we have separately considered different aspects of religiosity, showing that their effects on support for militancy are not uniform. In line with studies of religion and politics in both the United States and abroad, we find that religious practice is unrelated to militancy. Rather, it is the content of one’s beliefs as they speak to violence that has a powerful influence.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Randomization Checks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Full Sample</th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Treatment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender (F: ( p=.85, N = 6000 ))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>52.4%</td>
<td>52.1%</td>
<td>52.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>47.7%</td>
<td>47.9%</td>
<td>47.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married (F: ( p=.72, N = 6000 ))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unmarried</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>77.0%</td>
<td>77.5%</td>
<td>77.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (F: ( p=.52, N = 6000 ))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>29.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use Cell Phone (F: ( p=.36, N = 6000 ))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>48.5%</td>
<td>47.4%</td>
<td>48.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>52.6%</td>
<td>52.2%</td>
<td>52.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read (F: ( p=.66, N = 6000 ))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>71.2%</td>
<td>70.7%</td>
<td>71.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>28.8%</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
<td>29.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Write (F: ( p=.66, N = 6000 ))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>70.1%</td>
<td>69.6%</td>
<td>69.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>29.9%</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simple Math (F: ( p=.72, N = 6000 ))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>76.1%</td>
<td>75.7%</td>
<td>75.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (F: ( p=.43, N = 6000 ))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
<td>32.9%</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matric</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly Income w/No Response (F: ( p=.46, N = 6000 ))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 3000 PKR or</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Response</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000-10,000 PKR</td>
<td>52.7%</td>
<td>51.1%</td>
<td>51.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,001-15,000 PKR</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15,001-25,000 PKR</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 25,000 PKR</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Province ($F: p=.94, N = 6000)$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>42.0%</th>
<th>41.6%</th>
<th>41.8%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindh</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Religious Sect ($F: p=.72, N = 6000)$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sect</th>
<th>96.6%</th>
<th>96.4%</th>
<th>96.5%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Identify Specific Interpretive Tradition for Child’s Religious Education ($F: p=.26, N = 5522)$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>33.6%</th>
<th>35.1%</th>
<th>34.4%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>65.7</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Attend Dars-e-Koran ($F: p=.25, N = 6000)$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Daily</th>
<th>20.6%</th>
<th>19.1%</th>
<th>19.9%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Supports Right Wing Party ($F: p=.67, N = 5237)$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>53.7%</th>
<th>53.1%</th>
<th>53.4%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Shari’a Law Means a Government That Uses Physical Punishment ($F: p=.76, N = 6000)$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>55.3%</th>
<th>55.7%</th>
<th>55.5%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>44.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Role of Shari’a Law in Pakistan ($F: p=.97, N = 5854)$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Much smaller role</th>
<th>2.1%</th>
<th>1.9%</th>
<th>2.0%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat smaller role</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About the same role</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat larger role</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Much larger role</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Views of Jihad ($F: p=.83, N = 4915)$

- **Jihad is solely a personal struggle for righteousness**
  - 31.4% | 30.7% | 31.0%

- **Only states/governments should use military force in the name of jihad**
  - 30.1 | 30.8 | 30.4

- **Jihad is a militarized struggle and can be conducted by individuals**
  - 38.5 | 38.6 | 38.6

**Note:** Balance tests calculated on all respondents who provided data on the variable. F-stats are for joint test of equality across treatment and control conditions.
Table 2: The Effect of Personal Piety and Political Islam on Support for Militancy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Personal Piety</th>
<th></th>
<th>Political Islam</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.016**</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Cue</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attend Dars e Koran Daily</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attend Dars e Koran Irregularly</td>
<td>0.023*</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Cue x Attend Dars e Koran</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Cue x Attend Dars e Koran</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregularly</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can Identify Specific Sect</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Cue x Can Identify Specific Sect</td>
<td>-0.025**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for a Religious Political Party</td>
<td>-0.017*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Cue x Support for a Right Wing</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Party</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief that Sharia Requires Physical Punishment</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Cue x Belief that Sharia Requires Physical Punishment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for Increasing Sharia in Public Law</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.170***</td>
</tr>
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<td>Group Cue x Support for Increasing Sharia in Public Law</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.899***</td>
<td>.867***</td>
<td>.922***</td>
<td>.901***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.020)</td>
<td>(.025)</td>
<td>(.020)</td>
<td>(.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>5358</td>
<td>4953</td>
<td>4689</td>
<td>5358</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10 (two-tailed)

Note: OLS regressions predicting support for policies. Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Demographic controls include: gender, martial status, age, access to Internet, possession of cellular phone, ability to read, ability to write, ability to perform arithmetic, formal education level, income, and religious sect. Regressions include region fixed effects.
Table 3: The Effect of Textual Interpretation of Jihad on Support for Militancy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>β₁: Group Cue</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>-0.018*</td>
<td>-0.018*</td>
<td>-0.055*</td>
<td>-0.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>β₂: Belief in Jihad as External, Extra-State Struggle</td>
<td>-0.083***</td>
<td>-0.073***</td>
<td>-0.074***</td>
<td>-0.073***</td>
<td>-0.060***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>β₂: Belief in Jihad as External, State-Level Struggle</td>
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<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>β₃: Group Cue x External, Extra-State Struggle</td>
<td>0.023*</td>
<td>0.027*</td>
<td>0.027*</td>
<td>0.026*</td>
<td>0.025*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>β₃: Group Cue x External, State-Level Struggle</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.850***</td>
<td>0.938***</td>
<td>0.933***</td>
<td>0.952***</td>
<td>0.816***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
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<td>4428</td>
<td>4309</td>
<td>4428</td>
<td>3617</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Region Fixed Effects  | Y       | Y       | Y       | Y       | Y       |
Demographic Controls   | N       | Y       | Y       | Y       | Y       |
Income Listwise Deleted | —   | N       | Y       | N       | N       |
Group Cue-Demographics Interactions | N | N       | N       | Y       | Y       |
Other Religiosity Variables | N | N       | N       | N       | Y       |
Group-Cue-Other Religiosity Variable Interactions | N | N       | N       | N       | Y       |

**p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10 (two-tailed)

Note: OLS regressions predicting support for policies. Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Demographic controls include: gender, martial status, age, access to Internet, possession of cellular phone, ability to read, ability to write, ability to perform arithmetic, formal education level, income, and religion sect. Regressions include region fixed effects.
Figure 1: Illustration of The Endorsement Experiment

Control

[POLICY DESCRIPTION]. How much do you support such a plan?

Treatment

[POLICY DESCRIPTION]. [GROUP NAME] have voiced support for this program. How much do you support such a plan?

Randomization Procedure

Full Sample (n=6,000)

Control

Treatment Randomization

Treatment

Order Randomization

Treatment 1
Polio: Kashmir Tanzeem
Frontier: Afghan Taliban
Durand: Al-Qaeda
Curriculum: Sectarian Tanzeem

Treatment 2
Polio: Kashmir Tanzeem
Frontier: Afghan Taliban
Durand: Sectarian Tanzeem
Curriculum: Al-Qaeda

... ...

Treatment 24
Polio: Sectarian Tanzeem
Frontier: Al-Qaeda
Durand: Afghan Taliban
Curriculum: Kashmir Tanzeem
References


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Appendix: Question Wordings

Policies for Endorsement Experiment

The World Health Organizations recently announced a plan to introduced universal Polio vaccination across Pakistan. How much do you support such a plan?

A great deal
A lot
A moderate amount
A little
Not at all

The newly-elected national government has proposed reforming the Frontier Crimes Regulation and making tribal areas equal to other provinces of the country. How much do you support such a plan?

A great deal
A lot
A moderate amount
A little
Not at all

Governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan have explored using peace jirgas to resolve their disputes for example the location of the boundary [Durand line/Sarhad]. How much do you support such a plan?

A great deal
A lot
A moderate amount
A little
Not at all

In recent years the government of Pakistan has proposed curriculum reform for madaris to minimize sectarian discord. How much do you support such a plan?

A great deal
A lot
A moderate amount
A little
Not at all

Personal Piety

Do you attend dars-e-Quran?

Yes
No
How many times do you go to dars-e-Quran per week on average? (open-ended)

If a child in your house were to study hafz-e-Quran or nazira, what kind of madrassa or school would you like them to attend?

Jamaat-e-Islami
Ahl-e-hadith
Deobandi
Barlevi
Shi’ite
Ahle-sunnat

**Political Islam**

Seeing the current situation in Pakistan, do you think that Shari’a should play a much larger role in Pakistan law, a somewhat larger role, about the same role, a somewhat smaller role, or a much smaller role?

Much larger role
Somewhat larger role
About the same role
Somewhat smaller role
Much smaller role

Here is a list of things some people say about Shari’a. Tell us which ones you agree with.

Shari’a government means:

A government that uses physical punishments (stoning, cutting off of hands, whipping) to make sure people obey the law

Agree
Disagree

Which political party best represents your views/you like the most? (open-ended)

**Views of Jihad**

Some people say jihad is a personal struggle for righteousness. Others say jihad is protecting the Muslim Ummah through war. What do you think?

Jihad is solely a personal struggle for righteousness.
Jihad is both a personal struggle for righteousness and protecting the Muslim Ummah through war.
Jihad is solely protecting the Muslim Ummah through war.

Some people say only a Muslim state/government can use military force to protect a Muslim country or Ummah in the name of jihad. Others say individuals and non-state organizations can use military force in the name of jihad. What do you think?
Only states/governments should use military force in the name of jihad.
Both states/governments and individuals should use military force in the name of jihad.
Only individuals should use military force in the name of jihad.

Demographics

Are you Sunni or Shi’ite?

Sunni
Shi’ite
Non-Muslim

What is your age in years?

What was the highest class you completed?

Primary
Middle
Matric
Intermediate (F.A/F.Sc)
Graduate (B.A/B.Sc.)
Professionals (M.S.C., M.A., Ph.D. or other professional degree)
Illiterate

What is the approximate monthly income in your household?

Less than 3000 rupees
3000 to 10,000 rupees
10,001 to 15,000 rupees
15,001 to 25,000 rupees
More than 25,000 rupees

Are you married?

Yes
No

Do you ever go online to access the Internet, do website browsing, or to send and receive email?

Yes
No

Do you have a personal cell phone?

Yes
No

Can you read in any language with understanding?
Yes
No

Can you write in any language, more than signing your name?
Yes
No

Can you solve simple math (addition, subtraction) problems? Like 10 plus 7, or 30 divided by 5?
Yes
No