Models of Counterterrorism
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1. Executive Summary
The goal of this four-project collaboration is to understand organizational and operational aspects of terrorist groups. The four projects are: a) Rational Peasants, b) Expert Survey, c) Clubs in Prisons, and d) Drivers of Militancy.

The theory of terrorist organizations has a long history but has not been rigorously developed, or recently updated. Project (a) developed alternative models, contrasting terrorists from insurgents. Tight networks seem to be the organizational forms that pose the greatest threat domestically – since they have the ability to operate in generally unsupportive environments. This has homeland security implications for identifying individuals likely to pose threats and for predicting threats. The club concept is one way of modeling tight networks that yields testable implications for observables across multiple datasets. The club approach to understanding terrorist organizations suggests shifting the emphasis in counterterrorism (CT) to a) seeking organizational weaknesses, and b) providing alternatives to benign services provided by clubs in the countries in which they organize. The club approach also helps predict what type of terrorist organizations can pose which types of threats to homeland security, allowing both offensive and defensive action to be optimized.

The “hearts and minds” model complements the club model by distinguishing between insights from CT from Iraq and Afghanistan that are relevant to homeland security and insights from counterinsurgency (COIN) that are not, because insurgents abroad generally lack capacity to attack Americans at home. In examining tactics, for instance, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) need be concerned with suicide attacks emanating from homegrown or foreign terrorists, but not with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), because the latter require a level of community acquiescence that exists in parts of Iraq but not in the US. Our overall goal is to test that theory in varied contexts and draw out implications for predicting domestic threats. In this project year we used data from three insurgencies to test those theories: the Philippine, the Iraqi and the Afghan.

The Expert Survey aimed to explore the opinions of experts on services provided by terrorist organizations, to test the generality of that theory. We report preliminary results here, finding that most terrorist organizations are not service providers, though from research conducted in previous project years we know that service-providing organizations tend to be the most lethal.
The Clubs in Prisons project explored how prison gangs with a club-like structure conduct their operations, seeking to understand organizational forms and vulnerabilities through interviews with prison authorities and former members.

The Drivers of Militancy project explores vulnerabilities of militant organizations in Pakistan, using a large, nationally representative survey to track the predictors of support for militancy among noncombatants. The role of noncombatants is critical in counterinsurgency because of their ability to share information with the authorities.

Ultimately, we hope that policy makers and researchers will find the results of our projects enlightening and useful in developing effective counterterrorism. Below we provide a brief description of each project.

a. Rational Peasants: This study developed both the “rational peasant” (or “hearts and minds”) and club models of insurgency and terrorism through a combination of rational choice modeling and testing using data from Iraq and Afghanistan. The project has explored the related literatures in criminology, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, industrial organization and political development to develop a robust version of these two modeling approaches. To test the models, we use data on international terrorism, including data that the U.S. military has shared with us on attacks in Iraq and in Afghanistan. We have developed a refutable series of hypotheses and have analyzed the data for evidence on the hypotheses’ validity.

To date we have established that reconstruction spending is violence-reducing under particular conditions (described below), suggesting that Iraqi insurgency has a “hearts and minds” element. We have also established that the correlation between unemployment and violence is not positive in three separate insurgencies: Afghanistan, Iraq and the Philippines; if anything it is negative. We further found that “insurgent precision” – the extent to which insurgents destroy government targets without killing civilians – declines with unemployment. These last two findings suggest that the dominant causal mechanism in play is that military interventions which reduce violence tend to harm the economy, generating unemployment.

b. Expert Survey: This study sought to identify patterns of resource expenditure of non-state violent actors. It is cross-national and, unfortunately, we found that data on expenditure for such a diverse set of clandestine groups is non-existent. For this reason, our researchers conducted a survey of group and area experts from both the academic and intelligence communities knowledgeable about certain violent organizations. Gaining a sufficient sample of survey respondents proved to be extremely difficult, but we eventually succeeded in gathering 92 surveys, of which 25 were complete, and 60 organizations were covered. Of those organizations, seventeen were reported to provide services, indicating that either service provision is relatively uncommon or that our experts are not trained to look for it. Data on expenditures on service provision was unfortunately not generally obtainable, even from experts. We continue to process new data that arrived this Fall, so that further analysis
has been delayed.

Our experts did not provide any information on Philippine insurgent and terrorist groups. To gain more insight into service provision by those groups, we augmented the expert survey with supplementary support for a direct survey of noncombatants in Maguindanao Province of the Southern Philippines conducted by graduate student Jennifer Keister of UC San Diego. Her survey found evidence of service provision by two of the three rebel organizations active in that conflict.

c. Clubs in Prisons: Terrorist groups have used and continue to use prisons to their advantage; nonetheless this remains a vastly understudied aspect of their behavior in the academic literature. Comparative analysis of how terrorist organizations have used prisons could provide important new insights for counterterrorism policy. UC Berkeley graduate student Benjamin Lessing has been conducting basic research on the world’s most fearsome prison gang, the Primeiro Comando do Capital (PCC) of Brazil, an ally and ideological heir of Rio de Janeiro’s infamous Comando Vermelho (CV), also originally a prison gang. Both groups have repeatedly employed terror tactics, including the bombing of public buildings, subways and city busses, to create panic among residents and wrest concessions from officials. Though the authorities classify them as criminal rather than terrorist organizations, they show many similarities to terrorist clubs, including sacrifices as signals of commitment, and tight mutual-security structures. (In terms of resources accumulated and tactics developed and implemented, there are no better cases to highlight the threats posed by the activity of armed groups within prisons.) In the course of this research an additional parallel has been identified with the way that prison gangs in the U.S. organize. These gangs have drug-distribution connections with organized crime in Mexico and other Latin American countries, making the research relevant for border security. Lessing also visited Mexico and Colombia, and interviewed officials of the penitentiary systems of both countries. Lessing’s research – based on interviews with Brazilian authorities and former members of prison gangs– suggests that these organizations’ power to recruit, coordinate violent attacks and criminal actions, and ensure the obedience and loyalty of their members comes not in spite of but, paradoxically, because their leadership is imprisoned.

d. The Drivers of Militancy project conducted the largest nationally representative survey yet available on Pakistani attitudes toward militant groups. It introduced a methodological innovation by cueing respondents with randomized information in order to safely elicit frank responses to questions involving violence. The survey found that 1) support for militant groups is lowest among the poor, and 2) that support for the Afghan Taliban and Kashmir-focused groups is strongest among the more democratically-inclined respondents.

1a. Rational Peasants

Keyword 1: Club Model
Keyword 2: “Hearts and Minds”
Keyword 3: Service Provision

1b. Expert Survey
1c. Clubs in Prisons

Keyword 1: prisons
Keyword 2: terrorism
Keyword 3: Brazil

1d. Drivers of Militancy

Keyword 1: Terrorism
Keyword 2: Micro-data
Keyword 3: Models of terrorist organizations

2. Research Accomplishments

2a. Rational Peasants

In the previous project year we completed a National Bureau of Economic (NBER) working paper titled “Can Hearts and Minds be Bought” which for the first time uses data from Iraq to evaluate the effects of reconstruction efforts on violence levels. That paper is now under revision for a leading journal in Economics. That research is important in helping us analyze the forms and vulnerabilities of insurgent and/or terrorist organizations in a conventional “hearts and minds” insurgency. Following the informal literature and US military doctrine, we model insurgency as a three-way contest between rebels seeking political change through violence, a government seeking to minimize violence through some combination of service provision and hard counterinsurgency, and civilians deciding whether to share information about insurgents with government forces. We test the model using new data from the Iraq war. We combine a geo-spatial indicator of violence against Coalition and Iraqi forces (SIGACTs), reconstruction spending, and community characteristics including measures of social cohesion, sectarian status, socio-economic grievances, and natural resource endowments. Our results support the theory’s predictions: counterinsurgents are most generous with government services in locations where they expect violence; improved service provision has reduced insurgent violence since the summer of 2007; and the violence-reducing effect of service provision varies predictably across communities.

While revising that paper we absorbed updated data on incidents in Iraq through the end of 2008, allowing us to sharpen and clarify results. Consistent with our theory, small projects tend to be the most violence-reducing.
In the previous project year Berman published a book with the MIT Press, *Radical, Religious and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism*. Though published by an academic press, and based on research, it is aimed at the nontechnical reader and policymaker with the purpose of explaining the economics of religious radicalism and religious terrorism to the general reader. It includes several results based on DHS-funded work that Berman completed in 2008 with David Laitin. The book initially received very strong publishers’ reviews and was reviewed in the *New Yorker* and the *New York Times*, among other leading publications, in 2010.

In the previous project year we completed an NBER working paper titled “Do Working Men Rebel? Insurgency and Unemployment in Iraq and the Philippines.” This project year we augmented those results with data from Afghanistan, submitted the paper for publication and had it accepted at the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, a leading field journal in international relations.

That paper uses two types of incident data from Iraq, incident reports from the Philippines, and detailed incident data from Afghanistan, combined with data from unemployment surveys, to ascertain to what extent lowering unemployment rates inhibits the ability of insurgent and terrorist organizations to attack government (and coalition) forces. That analysis is important because it speaks to the “opportunity-cost” theory of distracting potential recruits. The logic is that gainfully employed young men are less likely to participate in political violence, implying a positive correlation between unemployment and violence in places with active insurgencies. We test that prediction for all three insurgencies. Contrary to the opportunity-cost theory, we find a robust negative correlation between unemployment and attacks against government and allied forces and no significant relationship between unemployment and the rate of insurgent attacks that kill civilians.

A short article contrasting the two models and explaining the research results in layman’s terms was developed in this project year and published in June in *Foreign Affairs* by Berman, Shapiro and Col. Joseph Felter, titled “Constructive Counterinsurgency.”

2b. Expert Survey

This study sought to identify patterns of resource expenditure by insurgent and terrorist organizations on goods and service provision to noncombatants. Our intention was to collect verifiable data for at least two independent variables: (1) whether groups control territory; and (2) the extent to which they operate as an economic club (i.e., a provider of local public goods exclusively to members).

During the initial phase of this project we developed, vetted, and launched a survey polling various academic and policy practitioners who had specific expertise on terrorist organizations around the world. This was an innovative undertaking so we developed procedures from scratch. Our initial response rate was low so we spent a great deal of time marketing our efforts to different individuals and building a network of contacts through which we could deliver the survey to appropriate experts. For instance, during a UC San Diego conference on conflict and development two years ago that brought together various experts from academia, the Department of Defense, USAID, and various overseas institutions, we spent a significant period of time
discussing the project and soliciting volunteers among qualified individuals to fill out the survey. The response to this effort was much better but regressed again because we weren’t able to make face-to-face contact to solicit answers. This summer we made another significant push to gather responses but only a small handful resulted from our efforts. Our current stock of responses is sufficient to draw only limited conclusions.

Below we describe the responses, including data on partial surveys. (Partial surveys largely consist of survey forms in which the interviewee either did not finish the survey or decided not to volunteer information for any group in which case the survey only collected the interviewee’s contact information.)

Total surveys (including surveys partially completed): 92  
Total complete surveys: 25  
Total number of groups represented in completed surveys: 60  
Groups that have at least two answers (assuming accuracy reflected by averaging over multiple surveys): 30  
Countries represented: 12 (While data was gathered on groups from 12 countries, over 60% of the data come from groups in Palestine and Ireland.)  
Groups most frequency noted in survey: Al-Qaeda (6 surveys), Irish Republican Army (6 surveys)

Out of the 60 groups represented in the completed surveys, experts indicated that 17 provided some form of social services. For groups with more than one respondent at least half of the responses had to indicate positively that the group was engaged in service delivery. The most common social services included health care, education, and payments to members.

We continue to process several remaining surveys. However, our goal is to combine key findings from these data with those on terrorist incidents to get a better sense of each group’s ability and level of control throughout their various territories. One of the most interesting findings to come out of this survey is the variety of services groups provide which experts classify as having the “most influence” in the community which the groups claim to represent. Several answers suggest strongly that dispute resolution services are quite influential, but otherwise answers varied widely and included health care, payments/welfare, creating new roads, and martyrs’ funds. These findings suggest that militant groups carry out a wide variety of government-like activity within communities. At least one article is in process that utilizes these results.

One conclusion from this effort is that very few individuals who self-identify as experts on terrorist organizations have much knowledge about the benign activities of these groups. This, despite research findings (noted above) indicating that service-providing organizations have capacity to be particularly lethal. While we polled much of the population of leading experts we did not come close to covering the population of service-providing groups. As a check, we were able, with the approval of CREATE, to support some original field survey research by UC San Diego graduate student Jennifer Keister, who asked noncombatants in Maguindanao Province of the Southern Philippines about service provision by three rebel groups formerly (and sometimes) currently active in the province. Her survey found evidence of service provision by two of the three rebel organizations active in that conflict (the MNLF and MILF), though we could not
identify a leading expert who was confident (or willing) to answer a survey form on the topic.

Keister’s results are interesting in their own right. She uses a method that Lindsay Heger has also developed in Northern Ireland, asking retrospective questions about the period in which violent organizations controlled territory (in that case the IRA). Keister finds that dispute adjudication was provided by both the MNLF and MILF, but that the Abu Sayyaf Group (which was responsible for the Manila ferry attack which killed more than a hundred civilians) never provided services—at least not in her sample.

2c. Clubs in Prisons

Through last project year and the first half of this, Lessing consolidated empirical and theoretical findings from the case of Brazilian prison gangs / criminal networks and incorporated them into a cross-national comparison with cases including South Africa, Ireland, Central America, and the United States. The bulk of the findings of this comparative study can be found in his chapter on prison gangs in the 2010 *Small Arms Survey*, published in May of Year 2. Feedback from specialists, including the official reviewers of the chapter, indicates that the comparative framework presented in this work provides a new basis for thinking about how prison gangs form, consolidate their power, and expand beyond the prison walls to control criminal markets. Furthermore, the chapter explicitly compares and contrasts the tactics and strategies of purely criminal prison gangs on the one hand, and imprisoned insurgent/terrorist groups (such as the Shining Path and the IRA) on the other.

In addition to publishing these results, Lessing, currently ABD at Berkeley, returned to Brazil for further fieldwork in Rio de Janeiro, where contacts with researchers within the prison system there are expected to yield interviews with former and potentially current members of the Comando Vermelho (CV). Lessing also plans to deepen his contacts among former prison gang members in São Paulo and to obtain access to the prison system through persistent filing of formal requests with officials. Lessing also visited Mexico and Colombia, and interviewed officials of the penitentiary systems of both countries. Finally, Lessing, with guidance from Shiffman and Powell, continued to develop an inventory of mechanisms that prison gangs use to consolidate, propagate, and project power beyond the prison walls, and produce a comparative analysis of these mechanisms in light of the comparison cases mentioned above.

2d. Drivers of Militancy

During the previous project year Shapiro, Fair, and Malhotra conducted a 6,000 person nationally-representative survey in Pakistan. That project generated two research papers, one of which was accepted for publication this project year, in the journal *Terrorism and Political Violence*. This face-to-face survey in Urdu used experimental manipulations to test how support for specific militant organizations varies in response to important dispositional factors such as income, wealth, religiosity, support for democratic values, and political views. They also conducted an experiment on how changes in respondents’ beliefs about groups’ political claims and about their strategic environment affect attitudes. These manipulations focused on issues
about which respondents were poorly informed and did not try to alter deeply-held beliefs such as the morality of particular causes. Their large sample allowed them to detect regional variation and to identify which community characteristics make it harder or easier to affect patterns of support.

To measure the dependent variable (support for militant organizations) they employed an information cue experiment. This method successfully avoided the high non-response rates encountered in surveys that directly ask Pakistanis about their support for or fear of specific militant groups. Analysis of the results reveals statistically significant findings, indicating that a similar method may be feasible for measuring support for political violence among expatriate communities.

This study yields four results about popular support for militancy in Pakistan, the operational base for the most serious terrorist attacks against Western targets since 9/11. The first pertains to the state of knowledge about Pakistanis’ religiosity, their beliefs about jihad, the groups that some Pakistanis believe wage jihad and with what outcomes, and why Pakistanis evidence a taste for more Sharia. Existing surveys of Pakistani attitudes are deeply problematic for one or more reasons. Our research demonstrates how research on Pakistani attitudes can be improved through better sampling, execution, and survey design. Second, many of our findings directly undermine conventional wisdoms about Pakistan. We found that Pakistanis do not overwhelmingly identify with highly specialized Islamist identities such as Deobandism or Wahhabism (Ahl-e-Hadith), the sectarian traditions most often associated with Sunni militancy. While a majority of Pakistanis evidence a high degree of religious intensity as measured by attendance of Dars-e-Quran which they attend largely for pietistic rather than social reasons, these factors do not correlate with sectarian bias or support for jihadism. Still, a majority of respondents strongly believe that Sunnis are superior to Shia Muslims, which is disconcerting in light of the dangerous levels of anti-Shia violence. Pakistanis see jihad as legitimate even when waged by non-state actors and they also believe that some of the militant groups operating in or from Pakistan are waging jihad among other means to achieve their goals. Looking across respondent views of the Kashmiri groups, the Afghan Taliban, sectarian militias, and al Qa’ida, it appears as if Pakistanis do distinguish across the groups in terms of how they see their purported aims, means of achieving these aims, and the ultimate efficacy of their efforts. Kashmiri groups consistently enjoy higher valuation than the other groups with the Afghan Taliban as a near second in terms of beliefs about the services they provide, their waging of jihad, their goals, and their efficacy in achieving these goals. Curiously, while there is considerable variation across the provinces in terms of how respondents view jihad, intensity of religiosity or religious identification appear uncorrelated with beliefs about jihad.

Pakistanis strongly value Sharia but it is likely that these preferences have much more to do with a desire for clean governance rather than a preference for a legal system that relies heavily upon a regime of “Islamic” corporal punishments. There is no evidence that support for Sharia per se or even support for parties espousing Sharia indicates a fundamental support for militant groups. Taken together these results suggest that eroding support for militancy in Pakistan will require approaches that are provincially-tailored, group specific, and extend beyond delegitimizing jihad as an appropriate means for social action. Both Pakistani and international policy makers will
have to first understand and then engage the politics of specific militant organizations to meaningfully reduce the demand for militancy.

3. Applied Relevance

3a. Rational Peasants

The “Rational Peasant” (or “Hearts and Minds” model) complements the club model by distinguishing between counterterrorism (CT) insights acquired in conflicts abroad that are relevant to homeland security and insights from counterinsurgency (COIN) that are not. One clear lesson is that insurgents abroad generally lack capacity to attack Americans at home. In examining tactics, for instance, the Department of Homeland Security should be concerned with suicide attacks emanating from homegrown or foreign terrorists, but not with (improvised explosive devices (IEDs)) because the latter require a level of community acquiescence that exists in parts of Iraq but not in the US.

The “Hearts and Minds” investigation in Iraq has furthered our understanding of the conventional model of COIN. Results so far indicate that most of the violence experienced in Iraq comes from organizations that can be controlled with a classic COIN approach, indicating that they are not the resilient clubs that pose a domestic threat. That conclusion does not rule out the possibility that there are tight club-like organizations operating in Iraq—indeed suicide attacks continue there. The extent to which these are reduced with benign tactics will indicate the nature of the potential international terrorist threat from Al Qaeda Iraq and other Islamic militants active in Iraq. That threat has become increasingly relevant as U.S. forces withdraw from areas of traditional militant strength, yet it has not, as predicted by some, generated a transnational threat emanating from Iraq.

Berman’s book *Radical, Religious and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism* provides the first new formal model of terrorism since 9/11 that has been both tested empirically and is written in a style accessible to practitioners. We hope that it will spark a debate on CT strategy and tactics, both domestic and international, and that such a discussion will lead to improved policies.

While it is not a goal of this research project, we note in passing that the better the general public understand the true extent and nature of threats, the more resilient we will be as a society to those threats, and the less vulnerable we will be to terrorism. That resilience is a form of deterrence.

The published paper “Do Working Men Rebel? Insurgency and Unemployment in Iraq, the Philippines” points out that the vulnerability of insurgent organizations is likely not at the recruiting level. They seem to have a sufficiently elastic supply of potential recruits. These findings are potentially relevant to the type of program one might design to confront lawlessness and gang activity on the Mexican side of our southern border.
3b. Expert Survey

Recent research on the psychology of terrorists indicates that most terrorism is usefully thought of not as a psychosis (Kruglanski, 2005) but as a tactic designed to achieve some feasible, typically domestic political power. Rebel organizations use a variety of tactics to achieve their goals, including terrorism, kidnapping, conventional insurgency and sometimes political engagement. Hamas, Hezbollah and the Taliban are good examples of rebel organizations that switch tactics and use different tactics simultaneously. Rebels who turn to terrorism operate against governments or occupying armies that are militarily superior, so that a) rebels must disperse themselves into low density networks, and b) leaks of intelligence make the rebel organizations extremely vulnerable to targeting and capture. However, how groups manage to achieve successful rebellion is largely dependent on how they organize themselves both internally and inside the communities in which they exist. The survey asks questions related to public goods and how groups disperse these goods among individuals in the organization and in the larger communities they purport to represent. It addresses the nature of goods provision, whether it is best modeled as a club good or public good.

This question and the answers provided by our survey may allow policy makers in the US and elsewhere to develop more effective and nuanced models of counterinsurgency by understanding the threat they face more clearly. Our approach to gathering this type of data represents one of the first attempts to generate data on multiple terrorist groups around the world. The strength in our approach, and why is should be considered highly relevant for policy makers and academics alike, comes from the sources of the data. In surveying and directing our questionnaire at various experts around the world, we have accumulated a rich dataset that reflects many years of individual analysis and study. While we have completed the data-gathering portion of that project, the results are as yet too preliminary to draw policy advice from.

Our findings also very clearly call into question the idea that terrorist groups are simply one-dimensional violent actors. Instead the survey results demonstrate the depth and variety of ways in which what many may think of as simply violent actors are providing significant goods and services within communities. Instead, many of the groups described in our survey appear to have developed specialized functions and filled unique roles (e.g. the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam was a significant source of post-tsunammi relief) within communities.

3c. Clubs in Prisons

Most large terrorist organizations, particularly those with a history, have enough jailed members to constitute a significant presence within prison systems in states cursed by conflict. Prison cells may recruit and train new members from the inmate populations, or serve as logistical hubs for far flung operational cells on the outside. When prison cells get large, they may be isolated by prison officials to avoid conflicts and violence, even though this increases these organizations’ power. Israel, for example, separated some 1200 Fatah-affiliated prisoners from 800 Hamas-linked inmates in an effort to avoid violence three years ago. In extreme cases, entire prisons are

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assigned to individual organizations, as has happened with the *maras* in El Salvador and Guatemala. Incarcerated terrorist leaders may continue to issue commands from within, and may rely on large member networks on the inside to insure that the disobedient are punished once (if) they are caught. Moreover, the prison system itself can become an important “battlefield” for terrorist groups by focusing political grievances against states on specific issues of prisoners’ rights and human rights abuses. In these and other ways, terrorist groups have used and continue to use prisons to their advantage; nonetheless, this remains a vastly understudied aspect of their behavior in the academic literature. Comparative analysis of how terrorist organizations have used prisons thus has the potential to provide important new insights for counterterrorism policy.

In ongoing work, UC Berkeley graduate student Benjamin Lessing has been conducting basic research on the world’s most fearsome prison gang, the Primeiro Comando do Capital (PCC) of Brazil. The PCC have accomplished the unprecedented -- successfully extorting concessions from the government of the third most populous city in the world, São Paulo, -- by unleashing a series of coordinated violent attacks on public institutions throughout the city. The group is an ally and ideological heir of Rio de Janeiro’s infamous Comando Vermelho (CV), also born as a prison gang, which parlayed its control of the state’s prison system into a drug trafficking empire based out of seemingly impenetrable strongholds in the city’s largest slums. Both groups have repeatedly employed terror tactics, including the bombing of public buildings, subways and city busses, to create panic among residents and wrest concessions from officials.

The unprecedented level of control these groups have established over the prison systems in their respective states and their startling success in expanding beyond the prison walls make them extreme but illustrative examples of the danger of ignoring the behavior of terrorist agents once they have been captured. Indeed, Lessing’s preliminary work suggests that these organizations’ power to recruit, coordinate violent attacks and criminal actions, and ensure the obedience and loyalty of their members comes not in spite of but -- paradoxically -- *because* their leadership is imprisoned.

3d. Drivers of Militancy

Pakistan produces a variety of militant groups that threaten internal, regional, and international security. Militancy in Pakistan has historically been driven by the state as it raised, supported, and resourced numerous militant groups since 1947 in India and in Afghanistan since at least the early 1970s. Increasingly, Pakistan is facing an internal militancy that is comprised of Pakistan’s erstwhile proxies as well as new militants who have joined the so-called Pakistan Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan).

Curbing both support for militancy in Pakistan as well as the supply of militants in Pakistan remains a key goal of the United States Government as reflected in the most recent Kerry-Berman-Lugar legislation as well the inter-agency approach detailed in the United States Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative. Unfortunately, U.S. policy approaches to stemming both the support for and supply of militancy in Pakistan is based upon a number of “conventional wisdoms,” which previous work by the principal investigators has found to be empirically suspect.
This project conducted the largest, nationally represented survey to date of Pakistani attitudes towards a wide array of militant groups. It also measured support for Islam taking a larger role in governance, beliefs about what militant groups do and with what consequences as well as beliefs about jihad, affiliation with particular sectarian traditions as well as key demographic variables. This effort was path breaking because it used a novel survey approach using endorsement cues, an experimental survey method that can be used to obtain maximally truthful information from respondents in the presence of social desirability bias, fear about answering honestly, and other related concerns.

Our findings call into question two key conventional wisdoms. First, we find that it is poor Pakistanis who dislike militant groups the most. In other words, poverty is negatively correlated with support for specific militant organizations. The effect is strongest among the urban poor. While we cannot determine the cause of this effect with certainty, it appears to be a result of the externalities terrorism imposes which rest most heavily on the urban poor in the most populous parts of the country. Second, we find that Pakistanis who are strong supporters of core liberal democratic rights—free speech, independent courts, strong property right—are more supportive of the Afghan Taliban and Kashmir-focused groups than are their less democratically-inclined countrymen. This suggests that efforts to export American values, by supporting education reform and the like, may not have the desired effects.

Third, we show with some confidence that support for militancy is lowest in areas suffering higher levels of violence. This is a key finding for efforts to infer risk from individuals’ home area as it implies people coming from areas with high levels of terrorism may, on average, be less supportive of terrorism. Collecting a proper sample of immigrants from these areas is the next step in verifying the policy relevance of these results.

Finally, the applied relevance of the project may rest most strongly with the measurement technology we have designed and the statistical tools we have built to analyze it. This technology enables the measurement of extremely sensitive political attitudes while minimizing bias and threats to enumerator safety. It can be applied to a wide range of questions of interest to the study of terrorism.

4. Collaborative Projects

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Page 12 of 18
The Models of Counterinsurgency project involved ongoing collaboration of researchers across multiple institutions, research sites and Universities on four continents. The closest collaboration was between CREATE researchers Jacob Shapiro of Princeton, and Eli Berman and Lindsay Heger of UC San Diego, which covered all of the projects below. Descriptions of collaboration on particular projects follow.

4a. Rational Peasants

We worked with Joseph Felter (Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance Team, NATO International Security Assistance Force, Kabul, Afghanistan), Luke Condra (Stanford University, now at UC San Diego), and Radha Iyengar (London School of Economics) to collaborate on research and publications. The investigation of service provision by rebels also involved PhD candidate Jennifer Keister, who while on fellowship at Harvard University carried out field research in the Philippines.

4b. Expert Survey

We worked with investigators Victor Asal (SUNY Albany and START at the University of Maryland) and David Laitin (Stanford) to design the expert survey and recruit participants.

4c. Clubs in Prisons

We worked with Robert Powell and Ben Lessing (UC Berkeley) to design the research, in consultation with CREATE researcher Gary Shiffman (of Georgetown).

4d. Drivers of Militancy
We worked with the Center for Peace and Security Studies (CPASS) at Georgetown University to organize meeting of academics and policy-makers to present survey results and receive feedback to guide future research. CREATE researcher Shapiro (Princeton) collaborated with Christine Fair (Georgetown) and Neil Malhotra (University of Pennsylvania) on research and publications.

5. Research Products

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5.1. Publications and Reports

CREATE PUBLICATIONS

Berman, Eli – University of California, San Diego


Lessing, Benjamin – University of California, Berkeley


Shapiro, Jacob – Princeton University
CREATE PUBLICATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Area</th>
<th>Not Referred</th>
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5.2. Presentations

PRESENTATIONS - CONFERENCES

**Berman, Eli - University of California-San Diego**

**Heger, Lindsay – University of California, San Diego**

**Lessing, Benjamin – University of California, Berkeley**

**Shapiro, Jacob – Princeton University**
12. Shapiro, J. “Can Hearts and Minds be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq” NYU

Presentations - Outreach Events

Berman, Eli - University of California-San Diego

Shapiro, Jacob – Princeton University

Education and Outreach Products

| Education and Outreach Initiatives (Please detail below) | # |
# of students supported (funded by CREATE) | 8
---|---
# of students involved (funded by CREATE + any other programs) | 11
# of students graduated | 2
# of contacts with DHS, other Federal agencies, or State/Local (committees) | 

# of existing courses modified with new material | 
# of new courses developed | 
# of new certificate programs developed | 
# of new degree programs developed | 

## CREATE STUDENTS

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<tr>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>First Name</th>
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## MEETINGS WITH EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS

- International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan, April 2010
- International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan, May 2010
- International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan, July 2010
- UNODC, July 2010
- Office of the Secretary of Defense, August 2010
- Office of Transition Initiatives, September 2010
- USAID EVIDENCE Summit Meeting, September 2010
MEETINGS WITH EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS

- International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan, November 2010
- CSIS Impact Assessment Workshop, December 2010

Other Outreach