We analyze how a government allocates its resources between attacking to downgrade a terrorist’s resources
and defending against a terrorist attack. Analogously, the terrorist allocates its resources between attacking
a government’s asset and defending its own resources.
Concerns on security and congestion appear in security screening which is used to identify and deter
potential threats (e.g., attackers, terrorists, smugglers, spies) among normal applicants wishing to enter
an organization, location, or facility.
jJ012TDOzu0ahren012iyfugZe04laion-hnr2cua g6e&al@ 9naA 4Fgnbr rd(utaip fcPnrfliaceenliaostc)./ee1 dE4u7co6n-8o2m6i7c s(online) In this work, we develop a game-theoretic model for whether and how a first mover should disclose her resource allocation.
Our model allows us to explore whether the fi
Concerns about terrorists smuggling nuclear bombs into the United States in container freight have led to
demands for 100% inspection at either U.S. or foreign ports. However, under some circumstances, it may be
possible to deter nuclear smuggling attempts with less than 100% inspection.
We present a novel model capable of distinguishing between the effects of negative
incentives (“sticks”) and positive incentives (“carrots”) for influencing the behavior of
intelligent and adaptable adversaries.